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CHAPTER 14 
Judicial Attitudes towards the Enforcement of Annulled Awards 
Jean A Penda Matipe and Prince N. C. Olokotor 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the issue of the enforcement of annulled awards under the regime of the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York 
1958 (New York Convention) through an analysis of recent decisions from the courts of the 
United States, England and France, to suggest the attitude courts in African States should 
adopt when required to enforce an annulled award. These three jurisdictions have robustly 
engaged with this question and their courts have proffered different reasons for the positions 
they take on the issue, which may be instructive to the courts in Africa. The issue is set out in 
14.01; and the theoretical and practical effects of annulled awards are briefly discussed in 
14.02. The approach adopted by the English courts is briefly examined in 14.03; the US 
courts in 14.04; and the French courts in 14.05; and a conclusion. 
14.01 The Issue 
The purposes of the New York Convention are to encourage arbitration and simplify the 
enforcement of arbitral awards globally. Whereas, the objectives of the New York 
Convention are clear, the equivocal wording of some of its provisions have been subjected to 
varied interpretations. Article V (1) (e) of the New York Convention particularly stands out 
in this regard. It sets out three grounds for the refusal of the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards which have triggered extensive comments and controversy as to their precise 
interpretation.  A case in point is where an award has been annulled at the arbitral seat by a 
competent authority, Article V (1) (e) of the New York Convention gives national courts of 
contracting states the discretion to enforce such award. Consequently, the examination over 
whether courts must or may refuse the enforcement of annulled awards is not just notional, 
but touches on the essence of the New York Convention. This is because it influences the 
inquiry into whether such awards can be effectively enforced under the Convention.  
 
14.02 Effects of annulled arbitral awards 
Theoretically, three approaches have been advanced on the status of an annulled arbitral 
award. The first view holds that an annulled award ceases to exist and is unenforceable in any 
other jurisdiction. This traditional approach, which reflects the jurisdictional theory of 
arbitration emphasises the territoriality of the state and in support, van den Berg argues that: 
…the fact that the award has been annulled implies that the 
award was legally rooted in the arbitration law of the country of 
the origin. How then is it possible that other country can 
consider the same as still valid? Perhaps some theories of legal 
philosophy may provide an answer to this question, but for a 
legal practitioner this phenomenon is inexplicable. It seems that 
only an international treaty can give a special status to an award 
notwithstanding its annulment in the country of origin.1 
One of the advantages of this approach is that it discourages endless forum shopping for the 
enforcement of an annulled award.2  
The second approach presupposes that an enforcing court is at liberty to enforce an award 
notwithstanding that the award has been annulled at the seat of arbitration.3 This approach is 
based on the delocalisation of international arbitration, which reflects the autonomous theory 
of arbitration and is justified on the grounds that international arbitration “cannot be deemed 
a manifestation of the state.”4  
Moreover, it is also a fact that the language of Article V (1) of the New York Convention is 
permissive and not mandatory.5 Thus, the enforcement of an annulled New York Convention 
award is at the discretion of the enforcing court. Arguably also, the enforcement of an 
annulled award can be based on the provisions of Article VII (1) of the Convention. This 
Article permits an interested party in an arbitration to rely on a more favourable enforcement 
regime than the Convention itself.6 In our view, if the enforcing court decides to enforce an 
 
1 Van den Berg, A. J. (1994) “Annulment of Awards in International Arbitration, in Lillich, R. B. and Brower, C. N. (eds.), 
International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards “Judicialisation and Uniformity? Transnational Publishers, New York, p. 
161. This view has also been upheld in Supplier v State Enterprise [2008] Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vl. 
XXXIII, p. 510 (Germany Court of Appeal, decided on 31/01/2007). 
2 UNCITRAL Explanatory Note on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, UN DOC.A/40/17 
(1994) at 7 (b) (24). 
3 De Cossio, F. G. (2016) “Enforcement of Annulled Awards: Towards a Better Analytical Approach”, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 17 – 27. 
4 Paulsson, J. (1998) “Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding Local Standard Annulments” Asia Pacific Law 
Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 1 – 34. 
5 Art. V (I) of the New York Convention provides inter alia: “Recognition and enforcement of the award may be 
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent 
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought.” 
6 In Hilmarton Ltd v Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation (OTV) (1994) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, vol. XIX, 
p. 655, (France Supreme Court, decided 1994), the court held an award annulled in Switzerland to be enforceable in 
France under Art. VII (I) of the New York Convention. Similarly, in Chromallory Aeroservices v Arab Republic of Egypt, 
award that has been set aside because its own law permits it, such enforcement decision is 
favoured under the New York Convention. 
Unlike the laws of the US and England, French law operates outside the New York 
Convention and does not distinguish between setting aside on national grounds and setting 
aside on internationally recognized grounds.7 French arbitral jurisprudence considers 
arbitration as belonging to a separate legal order with its own rights, distinct from the legal 
order of individual states,8 including that of the seat of arbitration and of the state in which a 
party wishes to enforce the award.9  
In addition, French law, relying on Article VII (1) of the New York Convention, applies its 
arbitration law,10 whose provisions are more favourable than those of the Convention.11 
Consequently, not all the grounds for annulment of awards under the New York Convention 
are applied in France.12 Instead, the grounds for annulment of awards provided in the French 
Civil Procedure Code (CPC) override those of the Convention.13 Therefore, French law does 
not contain as a ground for the refusal of the annulment of foreign awards, the setting aside of 
the award in the country of origin. Therefore, under French law, awards annulled by other 
member states of the New York Convention may be enforced.14  
 
939 F Supp 907 (DDC 1996), a US Court relied on Art. VII (I) of the New York Convention to enforce an award 
rendered and annulled in Egypt. 
7 Jan Paulsson, ‘Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment (LSA)’ (1998) 9(1) ICC Intl Ct 
Arb Bull 14; Albert Jan van den Berg, Should the Setting Aside of the Arbitral Award be Abolished? ICSID Review, (2014), 
pp. 1–26. 
8 Albert Jan van den Berg, Should the Setting Aside of the Arbitral Award be Abolished? ICSID Review, (2014), pp. 1–26 
doi:10.1093/icsidreview/sit053, p.20; Dominique Hascher, France, The Review of Arbitral Awards by Domestic Courts, in 
Review in International Arbitral Awards, IAI Series N°. 6 97-110 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2008); Denis Bensaude, French 
Code of Civil Procedure (Book IV), Introductory Remarks, in Concise International Arbitration 1133-1134 (L. Mistelis ed., 2d. 
ed. 2015). 
9 United Nation Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, 1985 U.N.G.A. Res 40/72 (Dec. 11, 1985), as amended by U.N.G.A. Res 61/33 (Dec. 18, 
2006) UN Doc A/RES/ 61/33. 
10 CPC was first introduced by Decree No. 81-500 enacted on May 12, 1981 and reformed by the Decree No. 2011-
48 of January 13, 2011 and entered into force on May 1, 2011. International arbitration related provisions are 
contained in Title II, Book IV. Under Title II, Chapter III focuses on recognition and enforcement of foreign 
awards or awards rendered in international arbitration proceedings. 
11 Denis Bensaude, French Code of Civil Procedure (Book IV), Introductory Remarks, in Concise International Arbitration 1133-
1134 (L. Mistelis ed., 2d. ed. 2015). 
12 Although similar in wordings with the provision in the New York Convention (Art 5) and the UNCITRAL Model 
Law (Art.36) etc. 
13 As per Art. 1520 CPC, other grounds includes: the arbitral tribunal wrongly upheld; or declined jurisdiction; or 
the arbitral tribunal was not properly constituted; or the arbitral tribunal ruled without complying with the mandate 
conferred upon it; or due process was violated; recognition or enforcement of the award is contrary to international 
public policy. 
14 Jan Engelmann, International Commercial Arbitration and the Commercial Agency Directive: A Perspective of Law and 
Economics, Springer, Germany (2017): pp; 50-54. 
The decisions examined below from these jurisdictions, where the enforcement of an 
annulled award is sought, it is usually anchored on public policy considerations.15 Different 
jurisdictions treat the issue of public policy differently.16 This is because, there is no 
internationally agreed standard on either the meaning of public policy or what constitutes 
public policy.17 There is also an absence of guidelines from international arbitration 
instruments as to how the international public policy defence should be interpreted,18 thus, 
shifting the burden onto domestic courts. For example, the Paris Court of Appeal, in 
accordance with the CPC,19 has often used the traditional restrictive French approach in 
explaining that international public policy:20 
…. refers to the French conception of international public policy, that is, the rules  and 
values which cannot be violated within the French legal order, even in the  framework 
of situations of an international nature.21 
Nonetheless, what remains unclear is, the test an enforcing court may apply in order to 
determine whether or not to enforce an annulled award.  
The third approach therefore, synthesises the territorial and delocalisation approaches to 
establish the criteria to be considered by courts in determining whether or not to enforce an 
annulled award. This approach is to the effect that an enforcing court should only refuse 
enforcement of an annulled award if the reason for the annulment is based on ‘international 
standards’.22 The effect of this third approach is that where an award is annulled on the basis 
of local standards, an enforcing court may choose to enforce such award.23 Therefore, 
according to Paulson, an international standard annulment has to reflect any of the grounds 
 
15 Art. V (2)(b) New York Convention; Art. 36(1)(b)ii) Model Law & 34(2) (b)ii) in relation to the set aside of an 
arbitral award on the ground of public policy. 
16 J.B. Racine, “Les normes porteuses d’ordre public dans l’arbitrage commercial international” in E. Loquin, S. Manciaux (dir.), 
L’ordre public et l’arbitrage, Actes du Colloque des 15 et 16 Mars 2013 (2014), pp. 7-35, at pp. 8-21. 
17 J.B. Racine, “Les normes porteuses d’ordre public dans l’arbitrage commercial international” in E. Loquin, S. Manciaux (dir.), 
L’ordre public et l’arbitrage, Actes du Colloque des 15 et 16 Mars 2013 (2014), pp. 7-35, at pp. 8-(19-20). 
18 Art. V(2)(b) New York Convention; Art. 36(1)(b)ii) Model Law & 34(2) (b)ii)  
19 Art. 1520 (5) CPC 
20 Art 1520 (5) is interpreted to ensure that "international public policy" is the yardstick instead of the wider 'public 
policy' as in J-L Delvolvé, J. Rouche, G H  Pointon, "French Arbitration Law and Practice: A Dynamic Civil Law Approach 
to International Arbitration, 2nd Ed, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands (2009), para. 294, p.156 
21 CA Paris, 14 June 2001, SA Compagnie commerciale André v. SA Tradigrain France. 
22 See for example, Paulsson, J. (1998), pp. 20 – 28; Lew, J. D. M., Mistelis, L. A. and Kroll, S. M. (2003) 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp. 719 – 720. 
23 Paulsson, J. (1996) “The Case for Disregarding Local Standard Annulment (LSA) Under the NYC”, American 
Journal of International Arbitration, pp. 99 – 114 
set out under Article V (1) (a) to (d) of the New York Convention.24 However, this approach 
is not flawless. Notably, it leaves Article V (1) (e) of the New York Convention redundant. 
Arguably, the intention of the drafters of the Convention is that Article V (1) (e) should 
provide a separate ground for the unsuccessful party to resist enforcement of an award that 
has been annulled.25 Given the Paulsson’s international standard argument, this separate 
ground becomes elusive or at best, in abeyance. 
There are also some practical effects of the enforcement of annulled awards and these have 
been the subject of extensive comments and controversy. This is because according to Born, 
the New York Convention does not prescribe the effects of either annulment or non-
recognition of an award.26 Nevertheless, the text of Articles V and VII of the New York 
Convention strongly suggest that an annulled or suspended award may, but need not, be 
denied recognition and enforcement in other contracting states. The crucial question that may 
then arise in an enforcing court, if an award is set aside at the arbitral seat, is the effect of its 
judgment (whether to enforce or set aside the award) on such award. Also, can an enforcing 
court in recognising either the judgment annulling the award or the award, be complying with 
its obligations under the New York Convention and its national law? These questions remain 
to be fully answered but go beyond the purpose of this chapter. In the following section, we 
briefly explore some recent decisions from the courts in England, the US and France, 
comparatively to tease out their practice or attitudes towards the enforcement of annulled 
awards, as examples for adoption by courts in Africa.  
14.03 Approach of English Courts 
In our opinion, the English courts approach to the enforcement of annulled awards has been 
hard-headed. Though, in principle, English law does not recognise the idea of delocalised 
arbitration, English courts have formulated a test they will apply to determine whether they 
will enforce an annulled award.27 The test for English courts is whether the decision of the 
annulling court offends basic principles of honesty, natural justice and English public policy. 
 
24 Paulsson, J. (1998), p. 29; the same grounds are also set out in Art. 34 (2) (a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
25 Koch, C. (2009) “The Enforcement of Awards Annulled in their Place of Origin: The French and U.S. 
Experience”, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 267 – 292; Lastenouse, P. (1999) “Why 
Setting Aside an Arbitral Award is not Enough to Remove it from the International Scene” Journal of 
International Arbitration, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 25 – 47. 
26 Born, G. B. (2014) International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd ed., Kluwer Law International, The Netherland, 
p. 3632 
27 Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K. (2007) Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and English Law 
and Practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 444 – 445. 
According to Darwazeh, in this test, the English courts have interpreted the text “recognition 
and enforcement of the award may be refused” in the New York Convention, literally.28  
In Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company,29 the defendants failed to honour the 
arbitral award despite the enforcement decision of the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam. Thus, 
the claimants commenced legal proceedings in England to enforce the award. The 
preliminary question before the court was whether the common law precludes the 
enforcement of awards that have been annulled at the place of origin. The court held that the 
answer was to be found in a test asking whether the court can in the circumstances treat the 
award as having legal effect. Simon J stated: 
In applying this test, it would be both unsatisfactory and 
contrary to principle if the court were bound to recognise a 
decision of a foreign court which offended against basic 
principles of honesty, natural justice and domestic concepts of 
public policy.30 
Similarly, in Dowans and another v Tanzania Electric Supply Co. Ltd,31 the court held that 
there was no question of an automatic refusal to enforce the award simply because one of the 
grounds for setting the award aside has been satisfied. The court further stated that “English 
Courts still retain the discretion to enforce the award, though that jurisdiction will be 
exercised sparingly”. Similarly, the court applied this pragmatic test in the recent case of 
IPCO (Nig.) Ltd v NNPC.32 This is because the court stated in IPCO that, there was no doubt 
that Section 103 of the English Arbitration Act (EAA 1996) is pre-disposed to the 
enforcement of New York Convention awards. Thus, even when a ground for denying 
enforcement is established, the court still retains its power to enforce the award. The court 
then went on to consider how such discretion would be exercised. The court referred to Lord 
Mance’s dictum in Dallah Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan.33 Paraphrasing the court’s decision, Gross J. held 
that, the enforcing court could if necessary consider the circumstances in which the original 
award was rendered and the circumstances in which it was later annulled. Also, the enforcing 
 
28 Darwazeh, N. (2010) “Art. V (1)(e)” in Kronke, H., et al, (eds.) Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Convention, Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherland, pp. 301 – 344. 
29 [2014] EWHC 2188 (Comm). 
30 Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company [2014] at para. 20. 
31 [2011] EWHC 1957 (Comm). 
32 [2014] EWHC 576 (Comm). 
33 [2010] UKSC 46 at pp. 67 – 68 
court would not be precluded from forming its own views on whether the foreign entities 
involved had complied with the appropriate legal rules.  
Most recently, in Maximov v OJSC Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat,34 the High 
Court stated that a claimant seeking to enjoin the court to exercise its discretion to enforce an 
annulled award  
…bears a heavy burden to establish not only that the foreign 
court’s decisions were wrong or manifestly wrong but that they 
are so perverse as for it to be concluded that they could not 
have been arrived at in good faith or otherwise than by bias35 
In Maximov, the defendant agreed to acquire 50% + 1 share of the claimant’s holding in 
OJSC Maxi-Group on the basis of a price calculated in accordance with clauses 3 and 4 of the 
parties’ Share Purchase Agreement. There was dispute as to the calculation of the purchase 
price, which was resolved by a Russian arbitral tribunal in favour of the claimant. The 
defendant appealed to the Russian Arbitrazh (Commercial) Court and the court annulled the 
arbitral award on various grounds. This decision was upheld on appeal to the first appeal 
court and on paper to the Supreme Court. The claimant brought proceedings to enforce the 
award in England. He alleged that the decisions of the Russian courts were perverse, and 
invited the Court to infer that those decisions were therefore procured by bias and should not 
be recognised by the English Court on the grounds of public policy. The defendant in its 
defence sought recognition of the Russian judgments which had annulled the award. 
Although there was no evidence of actual bias by the Russian courts however, the issue was 
whether bias could be inferred from the Russian courts’ annulment decisions. This was a rare 
argument and required the English court to come close in scrutinising the Russian courts’ 
annulment decisions on their merits. The claimant application was dismissed and the court 
held that it is not enough that the English court considers a foreign court judgment wrong or 
even perverse; the judgment will still be recognised. The court reasoned that such foreign 
court judgment must be so wrong that no court acting in good faith could have reached it. 
This is a high threshold to satisfy. The court then concluded that the English court will 
examine the merits of such judgment only to resolve whether it meets this threshold. 
Nevertheless, the court was very critical of the Russian courts annulment decisions, finding 
that the grounds upon which the award was annulled were flawed and some of them were 
barely even arguable. Nevertheless still, and significantly, the court did not find that the 
Russian courts annulment decisions were so wrong that the only answer must be that the 
judges were biased against the claimant. 
It can be fairly argued that the above cases demonstrate that English courts will not consider 
that an arbitral award stands or falls with the decision of the court at the place where the 
award was made. The courts have shown that an annulled award may survive and be enforced 
 
34 [2017] EWHC 1911 (Comm) 
35 Nikolay Viktorovich Maximov v OJSC Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat [2017] EWHC 1911 (Comm) 
at para. 53 
in England if the enforcing party can show that the annulling court offended basic principles 
of honesty, natural justice and English public policy.36 However, while the possibility of 
enforcing an annulled award has been recognised under English law and the courts willing to 
review decisions of a foreign court annulling an award, English courts are yet to enforce an 
award that has been annulled at the seat of the arbitration by a competent court. 
14.04 Approach of US Courts 
It appears that, from the case law on enforcement of annulled award in the US, the attitude of 
the US courts is unpredictable.37 In a plethora of cases, US courts have considered whether or 
not to enforce annulled awards. In some cases, US courts have refused or narrowly restricted 
the likelihood of enforcing an award that has been annulled by a competent authority at the 
seat of arbitration. For example, in Chromalloy Aeroservices v Arab Republic of Egypt,38 and 
recently in Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R. L. de C. V. v PEMEX-
Exploraciony Produccion (COMMISA v PEMEX),39 US courts enforced awards that were 
annulled by competent authorities at the arbitral seats. However, in Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. 
v Chevron (Nig.) Ltd.40 and more recently, in Getma Int’l v Guinea,41 US courts, while not 
contradicting or overruling Chromalloy, refused to enforce awards annulled by competent 
authorities at the arbitral seats. 
In Chromalloy, the US Federal Court for the District of Columbia enforced an award 
rendered in Egypt against the Arab Republic of Egypt notwithstanding the fact that the award 
had been annulled by a competent authority in Egypt. The Egyptian court annulled the award 
on the grounds that the arbitrators erred in applying Egyptian civil law instead of Egyptian 
administrative law to the dispute. Firstly, the court reasoned that Article V (1) (e) of the New 
York Convention permits, but does not require the court to refuse, the enforcement of an 
annulled award. According to Darwazeh, the court’s reasoning is consistent with the view 
that the text of Article V (1) (e) of the Convention is permissive and not mandatory.42 Lastly, 
in determining whether the annulled award could be enforced in the US, the Chromalloy 
court went on to consider the text of Article VII of the New York Convention. The court 
considered generally applicable principles of the US arbitration law and private international 
 
36 Tweeddale, A. and Tweeddale, K (2005) pp. 425 – 429. 
37 Park, W. W. (2012) Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and Practice, 2nd edn., 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 129 – 130. 
38 939 F Supp 907 (DDC 1996) 
39 No. 10 Civ 206 (AKH) 2013 WL 4517225 (SDNY 2013) 
40 191 F.3d 194(2d Cir. 1999) 
41 No. 16 – 7087 (DC Cir. 2017) 
42 Darwazeh, N. (2010) pp. 337 – 339. 
law as a more favourable rule. Thus, the court held that Chromalloy was entitled to 
enforcement of the annulled award under the Federal Arbitration Act (US, FAA), 
notwithstanding the text of Article V (1) (e) of the Convention and the fact that the award had 
been annulled at the seat by the Egyptian Court of Appeal, the competent authority. 
Some commentators have criticised the court’s reasoning that pursuant to Article VII, the 
enforcement rights under domestic arbitration law must prevail over Article V (1)(e) of the 
Convention.43 They contend that introducing national law through Article VII will bring 
about disunity and uncertainty in the interpretation of the New York Convention, especially 
where the national law conflicts with the Article V grounds. Nonetheless, Gary Born 
considers the court’s decision as well-structured, fundamentally correct and appropriate, he 
reasoned that: 
…with regards to the effect of annulment of an award, Article 
VI of the Convention clearly contemplates the possibility of 
recognising an annulled award, while Article VII expressly 
negates any suggestion that the Convention forbids a 
Contracting State from recognising an annulled award.44  
With regards to Article V (1) (e) of the New York Convention, it appears that the court in 
Chromalloy based its ruling on the premise that the Egyptian court decision was not entitled 
to be given effect, and that the annulled award merited enforcement under the Convention. 
The court’s consideration with respect to whether to enforce the annulled award and or to 
give effect to the Egyptian court’s judgment annulling the award, centred closely on the 
specific grounds for the annulment decision and the parties’ arbitration agreement. To this 
end, the US court concluded that the annulment decision breached both a fundamental US 
public policy – by the Egyptian court’s involvement in a detailed substantive review of the 
award, and the parties’ arbitration agreement – which had waived any such review. In our 
view, the Egyptian court’s detailed substantive review of the award was an affront to the 
 
43 See for example, Ostrowski, S. T. and Shany, Y. (1998) “Chromalloy: United States Law and International 
Arbitration at the Crossroads” New York University Law Review, Vol. 73, No. 5, pp 1650 – 1693; van den Berg, 
A. J. (1998) Enforcement of Annulled Awards?” ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
pp. 15 – 21; Wahl, P. (1999) “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Set Aside in Their Country of Origin: 
The Chromalloy Case Revisited”, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 131 – 140; Chan, 
R.Y. (1999) “The Enforceability of Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States: A Critique of 
Chromalloy” Boston University International Law Journal, Vol.17, No.1, pp.141–214; Freyer, D. (2000) 
“United States Recognition and Enforcement of Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards: The Aftermath of the 
Chromalloy Case” Journal of International Arbitration, Vol.17, No.2, pp.1 – 9; Sampliner, G.H. (1997) 
“Enforcement of Nullified Foreign Arbitral Awards: Chromalloy Revisited” Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol.14, No.3, pp.141–165. 
44 Born, G. B. (2014) p. 3630. 
parties’ arbitration agreement and the US court’s decision to enforce the annulled award was 
consistent with the New York Convention provisions. 
Recently, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York in COMMISA v 
PEMEX enforced an award annulled in Mexico, the arbitral seat, under the 1975 Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the Panama Convention).45 
In COMMISA, the award was rendered in favour of COMMISA in an ICC arbitration arising 
out of a contract for the construction of natural gas platforms between the parties. The award 
was subsequently confirmed by the US District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
PEMEX resisted enforcement by appealing the District Court’s ruling to the US Court of 
Appeal for the Second Circuit, and also initiating corresponding annulment action at the 
arbitral seat, Mexico. PEMEX contended that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by 
determining the parties’ dispute regarding PEMEX’s attempted administrative rescission of 
the contract. Administrative rescissions were not arbitrable according to Mexican law that 
came into force after the parties’ arbitration agreement and the arbitration proceedings.  
PEMEX’s application to annul the award was granted by the Mexican courts. The decisions 
annulling the award were premised largely on the new Mexican law prohibiting the 
arbitration of administrative rescissions. The courts reasoned that the arbitrators lacked 
competence to hear and determine the dispute in its entirety because the rescission and the 
breach of contract claims were intertwined. Following the annulment of the award at the 
arbitral seat, the US Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit remanded the matter to the New 
York District Court for reconsideration. In determining the issue in the light of the Mexican 
court’s annulment decision, the District Court was faced with what it described as the 
“dilemma” of whether to enforce the arbitral award, or to respect the annulment decision of 
the Mexican courts.  
In concluding whether to enforce the award and or respect the Mexican court judgment 
annulling the award, the New York District Court found that the Mexican court retroactively 
applied the Mexican law by rendering administrative rescissions not arbitrable. The New 
York District Court reasoned that the law applied by the Mexican courts was not in force at 
the time the parties contracted to arbitrate their dispute. In effect, the New York District 
Court concluded that COMMISA had a genuine belief that disputes with PEMEX were 
subject to arbitration, which was ignored by the Mexican courts ex post application of the 
 
45 Art. V of the Panama Convention is virtually identical to Art. V of the New York Convention. 
law.46 Accordingly, the New York District Court held that the Mexican courts judgments 
annulling the award “violated basic notions of justice” and therefore refused to respect the 
annulment, but enforced the annulled award.  
From both the Chromalloy and COMMISA cases, it appears that US courts will enforce 
annulled awards if they find that the annulling court’s decision violates the parties’ arbitration 
agreement and that refusing to enforce the award would violate US pro-arbitration public 
policy. Although, subsequent US courts’ rulings have largely endorsed the rudimentary 
analysis put forward in Chromalloy, notwithstanding they have deviated from the broad 
ruling in Chromalloy and declined to enforce particular awards that had been annulled at the 
arbitral seat.  
In Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v Chevron (Nig.) Ltd,47 the US Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, 
declined to enforce an award that was annulled at the arbitral seat, Nigeria. The US Court of 
Appeal discussed the Chromalloy ruling with approval that, Article V (1) (e) of the New 
York Convention allows, but does not require, the court to refuse the enforcement of an 
annulled award; and that Article VII of the Convention permits the recognition and 
enforcement of Convention awards under US law. However, the court distinguished 
Chromalloy and stated that “recognition of the Nigerian judgment in this case does not 
conflict with United States policy”.48 Nevertheless, unlike Chromalloy, the US Court of 
Appeal held that Baker Marine, the award-creditor, had “shown no adequate reason for 
refusing to recognize the judgments of the Nigerian court” annulling the award.49 
The US Court of Appeal decision in Baker Marine Ltd, did not detail its reasoning. 
Nonetheless it appears that the court relied on the fact that the parties had not relinquished the 
rights to appeal from the award under Nigerian law.50 Furthermore, the court also highlighted 
the fact that the Nigerian court annulled the awards on grounds of excess authority of the 
arbitrators and procedural irregularities, both of which are generally accepted grounds for 
annulment and which would be allowable grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement 
under the New York Convention. Some commentators have observed that the primary focus 
of the consideration of the US Court of Appeal ruling in Baker Marine Ltd was, whether and 
 
46 COMMISA at pp. 26 – 28. 
47 191 F3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999). 
48 Baker Marine Ltd, 191 F.3d at pp. 196 – 197. 
49 Baker Marine Ltd, 191 F3d at p. 197. 
50 Baker Marine Ltd, 191 F3d at p. 197, fn.3; 
to what degree, the Nigerian annulment decisions were entitled deference by another 
domestic court; and that this was appropriate.51 
Most recently, US courts declined to enforce an award that was annulled at the arbitral seat. 
In Getma International v. Republic of Guinea,52 the US Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s refusal to enforce an award that had been 
annulled by the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of the Organization for the 
Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (CCJA). The court stated that for an annulled 
award to be enforced in the United States, it must be satisfied that “the annulment is 
repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the United States. Getma has 
not satisfied that demanding burden”.53  
In Getma International, disputes arose between the parties to a contract to develop and 
operate Guinea’s main port in Conakry. Getma initiated arbitration proceedings after it 
purported that Guinea had unlawfully terminated the contract without adequate 
compensation. The said contract stipulated for arbitration administered by, and under the 
rules of the OHADA CCJA. Under CCJA arbitration, the CCJA functions both as an arbitral 
institution (providing the applicable procedural rules and other administrative duties), and as 
a supervising court (with competence to hear and determine applications to annul awards 
made in a CCJA arbitration). The CCJA on the application of Guinea annulled the arbitral 
award on the grounds that the arbitrators’ conduct in negotiating their fees directly with the 
parties exceeded their authority and breached the CCJA Arbitration Rules of 2011.54 
Nevertheless, Getma applied to the US District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce 
the CCJA annulled award. The US District Court considered the provisions of the New York 
Convention; the impact of the CCJA’s annulment; and the circumstances in which a court 
may derogate from the general obligation to confirm and enforce a foreign arbitral award 
annulled by a competent authority at the seat of arbitration. In its application, Getma 
contended that the CCJA, through correspondences from its Secretary General, ‘encouraged’ 
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the arbitrators to consult with and solicit an agreement from the parties to increase their fees. 
Thus, Getma argued that the CCJA’s annulment of the award was contrary to US public 
policy because it violated basic notions of justice. The court of first instance found that while 
the New York Convention does confer upon the courts the discretion to enforce an award 
notwithstanding its having been annulled, that discretion was narrowly confined. The court 
reasoned that such discretion would only be exercised where enforcement would be contrary 
to the US ‘most basic notions of morality and justice’. The court further stated that where a 
foreign court had annulled an arbitral award, a court in the US could only ignore such 
annulment on ‘limited ... occasions’ where extraordinary circumstances have been presented. 
In effect, US courts must be very cautious in considering notions of public policy. Thus, the 
court held that none of Getma’s public policy arguments was sufficient to permit the 
disregarding of the CCJA’s annulment of the arbitral award. To this end, the CCJA’s conduct 
was not repugnant to US public policy. 
On Getma’s appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, it was 
held that the CCJA is "a competent authority" for purposes of Article V(1)(e) of the New 
York Convention. For reasons of international comity, the court declined to second-guess a 
competent authority's annulment of an award in the absence of satisfactory proof of 
extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, because Getma's arguments failed under this 
rigorous standard, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the judgment of the District Court.  
Flowing from the cases reviewed above, it appears that the US courts’ attitude towards the 
enforcement of annulled arbitral awards encompasses scrutinising the annulment decision in 
order to determine whether it will uphold such decision or not. Though the standard has 
varied, it also seems that if something appears to be erroneous with the annulment decision, 
the likelihood of upholding such decision is greatly diminished. In Chromalloy, an annulled 
award was enforced because the court reasoned that the annulment decision offended the 
arbitration agreement of the parties. Also, in COMMISA the court enforced an annulled award 
reasoning that the award was annulled based on a retroactive law. However, in Baker Marine 
an annulled award was refused enforcement because the court found that the annulment 
decision was not tainted. Also, in Getma International, US courts upheld the annulment 
decision, reasoning that the decision did not breach basic notions of justice.  
 
 
14.05 Approach of French Courts 
French courts are well-known for their pro-enforcement policy in the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign awards in France, regardless of the position of the court of the origin 
of the award.55 This French position on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards has been 
reiterated recently in Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation 
(Russia),56 where the court dismissed the Russia’s argument that the award cannot be 
recognized and enforced in France after its annulment in the country where the award was 
rendered. The court ruling explained French law approach as follows:  
 “It is settled case-law that Articles 1498 et seq., which have become Articles 1514 and 
 following, of the Code of Civil Procedure on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
 Arbitral Awards, are applicable both to international awards and to awards made 
 abroad, without regard to their internal or international character. 
 It is also common ground that, on the basis of Article VII of the New York 
 Convention of 10 June 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
 Arbitral Awards, the same jurisprudence applies in the French law of international 
 arbitration, which does not provide for the annulment of the award in the country of 
 origin as a ground for  the refusal of the recognition and enforcement of the foreign 
 award.57 
 Accordingly, it is irrelevant whether the annulled arbitral awards are international in 
 nature, since they were, like those at issue, rendered abroad. 
 Accordingly, the plea that the arbitral award on which the seizure was based would 
 have been annulled or rendered null and void in France by the judgment of the 
 District Court of The Hague (Netherlands) of 20 April 2016 is dismissed. 
Therefore as a matter of French law, when an award has been set aside or suspended in a 
foreign jurisdiction, it is not a sufficient ground to dismiss the claim for enforcement of the 
same award on that ground, unless it is a ground enumerated in the French Civil Procedure 
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is invoked. It follows that a French judge cannot refuse exequatur when his national law authorizes it. 
Code.58 This case illustrates and reiterates an established attitude of French courts over the 
years, enforcing awards that have been set aside or suspended at the seat of arbitration.59  
According to Professor Emmanuel Gaillard,60 international arbitration has a transnational 
legal order in which no state should have the final say on the validity (or otherwise) of the 
award. Instead, each enforcing court should be entitled to form its own view on the validity of 
the award, regardless of the position of the courts at the seat of arbitration. Thus, the focus of 
the French judge is the particular award before him or her, not the conduct of the arbitral 
tribunal or the judgment rendered by the Court of another country.61 As a result, French 
courts consider that an international arbitral award is not “anchored’ or ‘integrated’ into the 
legal system of the seat of arbitration.62 Therefore, the view of seat courts on the validity of 
the award is irrelevant as to whether the award should be enforced or not in France.  
The recent development of case law on the compliance of international public policy shows 
that French courts have made it even more difficult for a losing party to resist enforcement or 
recognition of an arbitral award, or to obtain its annulment. Moreover, the constant evolution 
of the courts’ approaches in reviewing arbitral awards on the ground of violation of 
international public policy show the necessary changes adopted in their role of guardians of 
public policy. These courts attitudes ensure that France remains a pro-arbitration enforcement 
regime.  
The minimalist and maximalist tests of review have been used in the last two decades to 
ascertain whether the award complies with international public policy. According to the 
maximalist approach, courts in the review process must ensure that all public policy related 
elements of the case have been identified, examined and appropriately applied. As per the 
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decision in the Pyramids Case,63 the court before which the review was sought, held that it 
had unlimited authority to review the fact and law, all the elements allowing it to confirm 
whether or not the rules of public policy had been applied and due process followed.64 The 
court used the maximalist approach until in the early 2000’s while increasingly adopting a 
pro-enforcement and pro-arbitration view, which led to the current adoption of the minimalist 
standard of review. 
According to the minimalist test, the court’s scrutiny may consider only the compatibility of 
the effect of the award’s recognition or enforcement with international public policy.65 The 
scope of scrutiny is strictly extrinsic66 and the examination is limited to the “flagrant, 
effective and concrete” alleged violation. It is essential and sufficient for the French court to 
be satisfied that the award itself and the proceedings in which it was made, complied with the 
notions of French international public policy to ensure the recognition and enforcement of 
awards.67 
However, the level of scrutiny for reviewing awards in the last decade has relatively been 
dominated by the low standard of a “fragrant, effective and concrete” violation of 
international public policy, and this is mostly in the area of competition law. Since 2014, 
French courts’ scrutiny for reviewing awards have been consistent in using the maximalist 
approach, thereby ensuring that the awards comply with the rule of international public policy 
mostly in cases related to corruption and money laundry.  
The minimalist approach was followed in SA Thales Air Defence v. GIE Euromissile and SA 
AEDS France or “Thales case”,68 where the award in question ordered Thales to pay damages 
to Euromissile in a dispute concerning a license agreement. None of the parties had argued 
that the terms of the license agreement were incompatible with European competition law 
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before the arbitral tribunal. Later, Thales sought the annulment of the award on the ground 
that, the agreement breached European competition law. As a result, the award, which gave 
effect to the contract, violated international public policy. But Thales was estopped from 
raising new arguments about the dispute as it had not done so during the arbitration. The 
Court of Appeal dismissed the application as the applicant failed to demonstrate a “flagrant, 
effective and concrete” violation of international public policy.69 
In its decision, the Paris Court of Appeal explained that there could not possibly have been a 
manifest violation since no competition law issue had been discussed before the arbitrators 
and that, not every breach of international public policy can be invoked for setting aside an 
award, unless the severity threshold requirement is satisfied.  
On the meaning of the threshold “flagrant or manifest”, this refers to the substantial nature of 
the violation.70 It has been interpreted to mean that, “the task of a reviewing court is to take 
the award as it is and not to rewrite it”.71 Therefore the violation must be blatantly obvious72 
as opposed to the debatable violation.73 In other words, the court,  
“will only determine whether the award… in light of the factual and legal elements 
that were adopted by the arbitrator, violates public policy”.74  
Using the same meaning, the Court of Cassation in SNF SAS v Cytec Industries BV, 
subsequently adopted the same approach as in Thales.75 
The minimalist test was adopted by the Paris Court of Appeal until its controversial decision 
in Linde Aktiengesellschaft and Linde Hellas (Germany) v. Halyvourgiki (Greece)76 where it 
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attempted to use a broader scope of review77 similar to the “Pyramids formula”78. 
Nevertheless, the ruling in Lende’s case was closely similar to that in Thalès as in both cases, 
the Court underlined that an argument which was not canvassed before the arbitrators cannot 
be raised for the first time before the reviewing court. Otherwise, the court would be thrown 
into an examination of the merits of new claims, a situation that is beyond its powers.79  
Two months after the ruling in Lende’s case, the Court of Appeal made a sharp return to 
using the minimalist test in M. Schneider Schältegerätebau und Elektroinstallationen GmbH 
(Austria) v. CPL Industries Limited (Nigeria).80 Most importantly the limited scrutiny was 
entirely applied, but this time, in response to the annulment of the award on the basis of an 
allegation of corruption. In so doing, the court did not follow its previous decision (in similar 
situation) which applied a thorough examination of the law and fact.81 On appeal, the Court 
of Cassation confirmed Schneider's ruling in 2014,82 restating that the control should be 
limited. 
Schneider’s case evidences the discontinuance of the trend started by the Paris Court of 
Appeal in Lende’s case in the area of competition law, an approach that was not embraced by 
the Court of Cassation.83 Despite critics arguing that the approach was based on literally “no 
review”, on the finality of the arbitral award and the prohibition of the revision of awards on 
their merits by the courts. 84 
This area of the law is in constant evolution. Over the last four years (2014-2017) we have 
witnessed a new development with a series of judgments from the French courts and their 
interplay with international dispute resolution.85 These decisions seem to signal the 
abandonment of a limited scrutiny of awards to an approach allowing a thorough and stricter 
scrutiny of the facts and the law, mainly in cases involving allegations of corruption and 
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money laundry. The common factor in these cases is the absence of the requirement of a 
“flagrant” violation of international public policy.86 Consequently, the court investigates 
thoroughly the allegation of corruption and money laundry. Unlike the money laundry case 
which was set aside, all corruption related awards were ultimately confirmed.  
First, the case of Société Leaders for Management and Services Holding Company (Saudi 
Arabia) v. SA Credit Foncier de France (France)87 is the first of the three corruption-related 
cases decided by the Paris Court of Appeal, in the wake of the Schneider’s case. The facts of 
this case involve a loan agreement between SA Credit Foncier de France (CFF) and Gulf 
Leaders for Management and Services Holding (Gulf Leaders), subject to an underwriting 
fee, all payable in three instalments. After the payment of the first two instalments, for some 
reasons, CFF declined to pay the third instalment, rescinded the loan agreement and claimed 
a refund of the sums already paid.  
CFF began arbitration proceedings against Gulf Leaders to recover the outstanding sums. 
Gulf Leaders argued that the loan agreement was a product of corruption and therefore there 
could not be restitution as the contract was void ab initio. The ICC arbitral tribunal rendered 
an award in favour of CFF and dismissed the corruption argument, which had not been 
proven. Gulf Leaders after that, applied to set aside the award on the grounds of the violation 
of international public policy.  
In defining its level of scrutiny and the approach adopted, the court stated that when a party 
alleges that an award gives effect to a contract obtained by corruption,88 the judge in the set 
aside proceedings must analyse all the elements, facts and law, to determine the illegality of 
the contract. The court will also examine whether the enforcement of the award will be 
consistent with international public policy in an “effective and concrete manner”.89 In the 
ruling, the Court of Appeal found that corruption had not been established and dismissed the 
claim. It is important to note that this conclusion was made based on the court’s reasoning 
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and definition of corruption, after a thorough review of the facts and law as alleged by the 
applicant. This decision has recently been confirmed on appeal by the Court of Cassation.90 
The second case of Republic of Congo v. SA Commission Import Export followed the 
approach adopted in Gulf Leaders. The Congolese company, Commission Import Export SA 
(Commisimpex), undertook various public works projects in Congo in which Congo did not 
pay. The parties then signed an agreement containing an ICC arbitration clause (1992 
Agreement), providing a payment schedule for the repayment of debts. Again, Congo failed 
to pay and Commisimpex commenced arbitration and obtained an award in its favour in 
December 2000. Congo defaulted on its payment. In August 2003, a second agreement was 
signed in which the parties agreed to the amount due to Commisimpex under the 1992 
Agreement and the 2000 arbitral award (2003 Agreement). In April 2009, since Congo 
continued defaulting on its debt under the above agreement, Commisimpex commenced 
arbitration proceedings under the 2003 agreement. This 2003 agreement also provided for an 
additional debt founded upon a letter dating from 1992, said to have recorded decisions taken 
at meetings in that year. The 1992 letter had apparently disappeared and was “rediscovered” 
in 2003.This last arbitration resulted in an award in its favour. 
Congo sought the annulment of the award on the ground that the award contravenes 
international public policy as it gives effect to the 2003 agreement, which was obtained in “a 
general climate of corruption”, of which Commisimpex had taken advantage, and was 
therefore void for the illegal cause.  
Applying the same standard of review as the court in Gulf Leaders, the Paris Court of Appeal 
examined the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal and then, re-examined the facts of the case in 
light of the allegations of corruption put forward by Congo. It found that each of the claims 
presented as ‘suspicious’ had plausible explanations in contemporaneous evidence, and that 
therefore, Congo had not demonstrated that the arbitral award would give effect to a contract 
concluded in “a general climate of corruption”. Further, the Court stated that Congo could not 
free itself of contractual obligations by alleging “a general climate of corruption” within its 
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administration without specifying the individuals involved and without the alleged 
beneficiaries being prosecuted.91  
The third and the most recent of this trilogy of corruption cases is, SAS Man Diesel & Turbo 
France v. Sté Al Maimana General Trading Company Ltd,92 in which the Paris Court of 
Appeal applied the test used in the previous two corruption cases. The Court dismissed the 
application to set aside the award which was alleged, among other grounds, to have given 
effect to a contract tainted by corruption and consequently will violate French international 
public policy, if enforced.  
Before its ruling, the Court of Appeal first looked at the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal and 
subsequently, conducted its analysis of the facts, and held that each of the allegations of the 
appearance of corruption was in fact justifiable by contemporaneous facts and evidence and 
therefore, concluded that corruption had not been proved. 
More recently, in the money laundry related case of Valeri Belokon (Latvia) v The Kyrgyz 
Republic,93 the Paris Court of Appeal annulled a UNCITRAL arbitral award94 rendered 
against the Kirghizstan Republic for the violation of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 
between Latvia and Kirghizstan, on the ground that the enforcement of the award in France 
would result in allowing the investor to benefit from money laundering activities.  
Mr. Belokon, a Latvian citizen close to the President of Kirghizstan, acquired a local bank in 
bankruptcy in Kyrgyzstan in 2007 and renamed it Manas Bank. In the spring of 2010, 
political unrest in Kyrgyzstan led to the fall of President Bakiev and due to allegedly 
suspicious transfers of funds, the Republic of Kirghizstan National Bank (RKNB) took 
measures which in effect resulted in Manas Bank’s nationalisation. On 2 August 2011, Mr 
Belokon commenced UNCITRAL arbitration proceedings,95 alleging that the continuing 
extension of the temporary administration period amounted to indirect expropriation. On 24 
October 2014, the arbitral tribunal dismissed all the money laundering accusations raised by 
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Kirghizstan for lack of evidence and rendered an award in favour of Mr. Belokon directing 
Kyrgyzstan to pay him USD15.2 million. 
The Kirghizstan Republic started annulment proceedings in 2015 against the award on the 
grounds of the violation of international public policy. Kirghizstan argued (as it had during 
the arbitration proceedings) that the award will give effect to money laundering and other 
criminal activities that violated Kyrgyz criminal law and public policy. 
The Paris Appeal Court, considered the factual elements relied upon by the arbitral tribunal 
as well as other more recent evidence that was presented. Based on its findings, the Court of 
Appeal reached a different conclusion from that of the arbitral tribunal and set aside the 
award. This was on the basis that its recognition or enforcement would be contrary to 
international public policy. Explaining its decision, the Court said that its task was to 
determine whether the recognition or enforcement of the award would undermine the fight 
against money laundering by allowing a party to benefit from criminal activities. In carrying 
out this assessment, the Court said that it was not limited to the evidence available to the 
arbitral tribunal or bound by its evaluation of the record, although it added that due process 
must always be respected.96  
These four cases reveal the new approach and the extent of the scrutiny that French courts 
may now perform when dealing with set aside applications based on allegations of a breach 
of international public policy. In summary, the Paris Court of Appeal appears to conduct a 
relatively thorough review by examining in detail the evidence that was put before the arbitral 
tribunal and would consider new evidence where appropriate. This extent of review share 
similarities with the reasoning in three 2014 Paris Court of Appeal decisions in the area of 
corruption (Gulf Leaders, République du Congo v. Commisimpex and SAS Man Diesel), the 
first two of which have been upheld by the Court of Cassation. For now, this approach is 
limited to cases where issues of money laundering and corruption are alleged and they also 
demonstrate that this stricter and thorough control can be used in the context of investment 
arbitration.  
Conclusion  
We have not found any relevant cases that addressed this issue substantively from courts in 
Africa. We suspect that the colonial ties of the various African jurisdictions and their legal 
 
96 Belokon’s case is referred by the CA as the first case the Court sets aside an award on allegation of money 
laundering. 
systems and laws will play a major role in the attitude each African jurisdiction will adopt 
when its courts are confronted with this issue. From our examination of the case law from the 
three primary jurisdictions, the concepts adopted across the jurisdictions are similar yet, their 
approaches are different.  
The recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is one of the fundamental 
principles of the New York Convention in its role of creating a universal framework which 
enables parties to international arbitration agreements to enforce their foreign arbitral awards 
with relative ease. Court review of arbitral awards at the seat of the arbitration or in the 
country where recognition and enforcement are sought includes an examination of (national 
or international) public policy rules.97 However as shown above, the content of the rules of 
international public policy and the judicial attitude in determining the recognition and 
enforcement of awards may vary from one jurisdiction to the other.98 Given the broad and 
diverse approaches adopted by courts on this issue, there is a clear need to narrow the gap in 
the approaches and to find a universal test to be applied by national courts, which will ease 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards.  
In our opinion, first, the award and nothing but the award in question should be the only 
focus of the reviewing court. Second, when appropriate, the level of scrutiny must be limited 
but with more effective examination; in order words, courts should assess rather than 
scrutinize the compliance of the award with the rules of public policy.99 In that sense, the 
review process will not be subject to the two extremes of: a new trial, or no real review at all. 
Third, national arbitration laws need to consider including a mandatory requirement for the 
validity of arbitral awards to include, that all awards made in their territory must conform 
with their national and internationally recognised public policy rules. Fourth, state courts 
must play their role in ensuring that the above rules are upheld and as guardians of public 
policy, should not hesitate to conduct a more detailed scrutiny. 
In our considered opinion, these measures, if collectively agreed and taken will bring some 
much-needed consistency and predictability in this area of the law and further strengthen the 
provisions and application of the New York Convention. 
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98 This is due in part to the limited scope and outdated provisions of the New York Convention and  the  copying  
of  the  New  York  Convention  into  the UNCITRAL and also by the impossibility among legal scholars and 
practitioners to agree on a universal guidelines on these subjects. 
99 C. Jarrosson, “L’intensité du contrôle de l’ordre public”in E. Loquin, S. Manciaux (dir.), L’ordre public et l’arbitrage, 
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